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John Capps* 
Radical Pragmatism: An Operator’s Guide 
Abstract: Huw Price has recently argued that representationalism – the notion that 
the primary function of statements is to represent the world – is an utter failure. 
In its place he proposes a “global expressivism” that instead links the meaning 
of statements to how they are used. This makes his global expressivism a kind 
of pragmatism: a linguistic pragmatism because it focuses on linguistic meaning; 
a radical pragmatism because it rejects representationalism across the board. 
Price also introduces a distinction between two types of representation: external 
representation, which he mostly rejects, and internal representation, which he 
champions. In this article I weigh the strengths of Price’s radical pragmatism. 
I conclude that radical pragmatism has signiicant beneits, especially if we 
supplement external and internal representation with a third variety that I call 
operational representation.
Introduction: Radical Linguistic Pragmatism
Pragmatists have a problem. Much as the term “liberal” has both a general, everyday 
sense and a more precise, philosophical sense – and, worse, these two senses may 
conlict with each other – “pragmatism” too can take on different meanings depending 
on the situation. To begin with there is, of course, the common everyday sense of 
“pragmatism”: here, to be pragmatic is to be moderate, middle-of-the-road, and non-
ideological. Then there is the philosophical sense of pragmatism: here, Pragmatism 
is associated with a particular philosophical orientation, one that emphasizes use and 
practice over abstractions and abstract theorizing, an orientation that may even involve 
particular ways of theorizing about such things as truth and meaning. Pushed further, 
philosophical Pragmatism also stakes out very speciic claims in epistemology, the 
philosophy of language, legal theory, and other areas1. 
Given these two senses, it is natural to ask whether and how a radical Pragmatism 
is possible, a version of philosophical Pragmatism that is neither moderate nor 
middle-of-the-road, a version of Pragmatism that is anything but pragmatic. Certainly 
Rorty-style neo-Pragmatism of the 1980s and 1990s had a reputation for being radical 
– but it also found many critics among philosophers. Some philosophers castigated 
Rorty for betraying the Pragmatic tradition, while others chastised him for endorsing 
cultural relativism2. More recently, a second wave of neo-Pragmatists – many of them 
former students of Rorty’s or directly inluenced by him – have defended Pragmatic 
approaches that ostensibly avoid the problems of Rortyan neo-Pragmatism. These 
second-wave neo-Pragmatists, including Philip Kitcher, Robert Brandom, Michael 
* Rochester Institute of Technology [jmcgsh@rit.edu]
1. To keep these two senses separate, I’ll be capitalizing the second, philosophical, sense of 
“Pragmatism” while reserving the lower-case “pragmatism” for the irst, everyday sense of the word.
2. Still, for a strong defense of Rorty’s anti-representationalism see Clough 2003.
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Williams, and Huw Price, have staked out positions that, while inspired by Rorty, 
diverge from his position to a greater or lesser degree3. Of these, Huw Price’s 
Pragmatism is likely closest to Rorty’s – a point which Price himself concedes4.
Like Rorty, Price deines Pragmatism primarily in terms of an anti-representa-
tionalist approach to linguistic meaning. An assertion’s meaning is not, Price argues, 
a function of what it may or may not represent; an assertion may have meaning, 
in other words, even if it represents nothing at all. Price defends a “global anti-
representationalism” that rejects representationalism across the board. In its place he 
proposes a global expressivism or inferentialism that goes well beyond the intentions 
of those – Simon Blackburn and Robert Brandom, in particular – who’ve helped put 
more local forms of expressivism and inferentialism on the map5. By taking anti-
representationalism to its logical extreme, Price’s Pragmatism is certainly not middle-
of-the-road. In fact, it is a most unpragmatic Pragmatism.
Thus Price takes Pragmatism to be primarily a linguistic thesis: essentially, global 
anti-representationalism with regard to linguistic meaning. It might appear that, if he is 
correct, and if Pragmatism equates to global anti-representationalism, then it is possible 
to have a free-standing radical Pragmatism that doesn’t require additional support 
from Pragmatist conceptions of truth, justiication, experience, or what-have-you. In 
fact, his position is more subtle. Though he defends global anti-representationalism, 
he actually proposes replacing one sense of “representation” (“e-representation”) with 
another (“i-representation”). I’ll argue here that his proposal is only partly successful: 
while arguing in support of his radically pragmatic global anti-representationalism, I’ll 
also propose yet another way of thinking about representation. To put it briely, there is 
an important sense of representation – what I’ll call “operational representation” – that 
Price overlooks. Recognizing this third sense of representation permits a Pragmatism 
that is no less radical in its anti-representationalism but that, nonetheless, presents an 
opening for Pragmatist accounts of truth, justiication, and experience. 
Pragmatic Prelude
Before going further I’d like to say a few words about what’s at stake. The basic 
question is this: when we make a statement, what does that statement do? Of all the 
functions that our statements serve – to describe, to convince, to express, to prescribe 
or proscribe, etc. – which is most basic? This is a theoretical question, but there’s also 
a practical side: how we answer this question will affect how we understand other 
things we care deeply about.
For example, most everyone cares – in some way, shape, or form – about the kind 
3. See, for example, the essays in Kitcher 2012; Brandom 2011, Price 2011 and 2013, as well as 
Williams 2013.
4. Price writes, “I may be somewhere between Rorty and Brandom – though if so, I think, then not very 
far from either” (2013: 193).
5. See Blackburn 1993, and Brandom 2000 for details. Price prefers to call his position a kind of 
“expressivism” but his anti-representationalism could just as well (and perhaps more accurately) be 
described as a form of inferentialism. Here I will typically follow Price’s lead and refer to his position 
as “global expressivism”.
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of person they are. We care about being the sort of person who tries to tell the truth, 
who loves her children, who appreciates good music, and who is concerned about 
global climate change. But not only do we care about being this sort of person, we also 
state that it is good to be this sort of person: we state that it is good to tell the truth, to 
love your children, and to be worried about climate change. We naturally treat these 
statements, statements about our most basic commitments, as both meaningful and, 
we hope, true. But what makes these statements meaningful and true? And are they 
really meaningful and true? Some attempts to answer these questions will strike many 
of us as clearly inadequate (though it may be hard to say exactly why). Ayer’s (1936) 
emotivism is one example: most of us ind it preposterous that, when we say “it is 
good to love your children”, we’re only expressing an emotion. There must be more 
to it than that, we tell ourselves, especially given the importance of these statements. 
Likewise, Mackie’s (1977) error theory will strike most of us as unacceptable (though 
again it may be dificult to say why). To propose that ethical statements are universally 
false just doesn’t do justice to their importance.
Of course, we care about other statements too – statements about the physical 
world, or about history, or about politics, or recent movies, or even celebrity gossip. 
We want to get clear on these as well. But not all of us care about history, or politics, 
or science in the same way that we all do care, or should care, about the kind of 
person we are. This makes statements about our character and ethical commitments 
especially important and interesting. And it makes understanding these statements 
likewise important and interesting.
As a result, the issue of representationalism is, in part, the issue of how we make 
sense of statements, some of which are especially critical to how we understand 
ourselves and our most basic commitments. Granted, it’s not a practical question in 
the same sense as choosing the right weight of motor oil. But it is a practical question 
in the sense of getting our cognitive house in order, of making sure that we can explain 
and defend the basic commitments that make us who we are.
Often, working out the details is a pretty drab affair. Knowing there’s this practical 
pay-off can help us through the dry spots. With that in mind, here’s a Pragmatic 
approach to representationalism.
Pragmatism, Anti-Representationalism, and Expressivism
For Price, Pragmatism equates to anti-representationalism. Even more, Price 
defends a Pragmatism that is not just opposed to representationalism, it is globally 
opposed to representationalism: that is, opposed to “the idea that the function of 
statements is to ‘represent’ worldly states of affairs and that true statements succeed 
in doing so” (2013: 24). The main problem for representationalism, Price argues, is 
“the placement issue”. This is the problem of distinguishing between those discourses 
that are easily understood in representationalist terms (science and everyday talk of 
facts would be two examples) and those that are not. For example, moral discourse 
is often viewed as non-representational: the assertion “torture is wrong” just doesn’t 
seem representational in quite the same way that “my house is green” seems to clearly 
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represent my house and its color. The representationalist must then explain how to 
“place” these discourses so that (a) they still involve making meaningful assertions 
even though (b) these assertions do not represent anything. 
In other words, representationalism runs into problems because it is far from clear 
what many apparently meaningful assertions could possibly represent, if they represent 
anything at all. Again, moral discourse is one such area. In our naturalistic age, few 
are willing to accept moral “facts” – with the result that, if we want moral discourse 
to be meaningful, then we must reject the idea that it represents the facts. Modal 
discourse is another problematic area: assertions about what is necessary or possible 
seem perfectly meaningful (and these assertions have a central role in good scientiic 
reasoning) but it is dificult, once again, to describe what exactly these assertions 
represent. Like moral facts, modal facts are the sort of thing that many philosophers 
are not eager to embrace. As a result, it’s hard to defend representationalism globally, 
across all types of discourse.
Instead, one approach is to propose alternatives to representationalism that 
explain the meaningfulness of moral and modal discourse, but without relying on 
representationalist assumptions. Blackburn’s and Gibbard’s expressivism is perhaps 
the best known alternative with respect to moral discourse6. According to Blackburn 
and Gibbard, we should not view moral discourse as attempting (or, as error theorists 
have it, attempting and inevitably failing) to represent the moral terrain. Better, they 
argue, is to view moral discourse in “expressivist” terms, as the expression of a certain 
evaluative attitude. As Gibbard puts it:
Metaethics asks what ethical questions are: what does it mean to call an act wise or 
foolish, admirable or reprehensible?...The expressivist’s strategy is to change the 
question. Don’t ask directly how to deine “good”, for no correct deinition can break out 
of a normative circle[...]. Instead of seeking a straight deinition, expressivists propose, 
seek a characterization of a different form. Ask what states of mind ethical statements 
express [...]. The term “expressivism” I mean to cover any account of meanings that 
follows this indirect path: to explain the meaning of a term, explain what states of mind 
the term can be used to express. (2003: 6-7)
Or in Blackburn’s words:
The theory I want to defend is one that gives a story about the way in which ethical 
thought functions. Valuing something, it says, is not to be understood as describing it 
in certain terms, any more than hoping for or desiring something are describing it in 
particular terms. Rather, the state of mind of one who values something is distinctive, 
but nevertheless it is itself a natural, and naturally describable, state. Once we ind 
ethics here, we understand the essential phenomenon, which is that of people valuing 
things. When they value things, they express themselves in terms of what is good, bad, 
obligatory, right, justiiable, and so on [...]. The ethical proposition gets its identity as 
a focus for practical thought, as people communicate their certainties, insistences, and 
doubts about what to value.
6. See Blackburn 1993 and Gibbard 1992 for the canonical case in support of expressivism.
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This strategy – that of expressivism – leaves ethical properties and propositions 
alone with their own speciic identities (1998: 49-50).
If Gibbard and Blackburn are correct, then the meaning of moral terms is a 
function of what they are used to do – namely, express evaluative attitudes – and is 
not a function of whether they successfully represent a “worldly state of affairs”. 
Clearly these arguments support only a “local” expressivism. Perhaps moral 
discourse is best understood expressively while other types of discourse are best 
understood representationally. Thus, local expressivism is compatible with local 
representationalism. Moreover, being sensitive to variations among discourses looks 
like the pragmatic way to go.
But Price disagrees. Local expressivism still poses the “placement issue” 
of providing a principled, non-ad hoc reason for treating some discourses as 
representational and others as expressive. Price’s solution instead is to argue for 
global expressivism and reject representationalism across the board. The placement 
issue evaporates along with any role for representationalism.
Price’s case for global expressivism has two sides. The irst is negative: like 
Rorty, Price claims that the arguments for representationalism are weak, riddled 
with unjustiied assumptions, and generally unconvincing. In short, there are serious 
dificulties in getting a representational account off the ground, regardless of the area 
of discourse7. The second side is positive: Price argues that global expressivism can do 
a better job than either global representationalism or local expressivism at explaining 
our linguistic practices. In other words, he claims that global expressivism has the 
conceptual resources for us to discard representationalism and never look back. 
So before getting into details, it’s worth keeping two related questions in mind. 
The irst question is empirical: does global expressivism correctly describe how we 
talk? Perhaps expressivism does give the best account of how we use ethical language. 
But representationalism seems to be the best account of what’s happening when we 
talk about science or everyday physical objects. When I say “my house is green”, it 
seems evident that I am representing some worldly state of affairs. How does global 
expressivism explain this away? 
The second is a question of consistency: is Price being consistently Pragmatic? 
Because Pragmatists connect meaning with use, they often tell genealogical stories 
showing how certain theoretical concepts can be traced to common, concrete, 
interactions with the physical world. These stories describe a physical world that is 
causally connected to the concepts we use and the ways we talk and, as a result, 
it’s natural to view them as representing that physical world: they thus seem to 
take representationalism for granted. If that’s so, then there’s an evident tension 
between Pragmatism and global expressivism, and Price must show how his global 
expressivism does not undercut his Pragmatism.
7. I’ll largely concede Price’s points against representationalism. For the details of his argument see 
the irst of his Descartes lectures “Naturalism without Representationalism” (2013: 3-21), as well as 
the essays “Moving the Mirror Aside” (2011: 3-33), and “One Cheer for Representationalism?” (2011: 
304-321).
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Two Types of Representation
Price responds to the empirical question – isn’t scientiic discourse representational? 
– by arguing that global expressivism can account for types of discourse that seem 
obviously representational. This would mean that scientiic discourse, say, is different 
only in degree, not in kind, from moral and modal discourse.
Price’s argument rests on a distinction between two different senses of 
“representation”. The irst, “e-representation”, is representation as traditionally 
understood (“e” stands for “environmental” or “externalist”):
On the one hand, we have the environment-tracking paradigm of representation, 
dependent on such notions as covariation...think of examples such as the position of 
the needle in the fuel gauge and the level of fuel in the tank, the barometer reading 
and air pressure and so on. In these cases, the crucial idea is that some feature of the 
representing system either does, or is (in some sense) “intended to”, vary in parallel 
with some feature of the represented system [...]. In biological cases, for example, this 
notion gives priority to the idea that the function of a representation is to co-vary with 
some (typically) external environmental condition: it puts the system-world link on the 
front foot. (2013: 36, emphasis in original)
Price raises familiar objections to representation in this sense. First, he argues that 
representationalism can’t work as a global account of linguistic practice. Then, turning 
to Blackburn’s quasi-realism and expressivism, and to Brandom’s inferentialism, he 
argues that these alternative accounts can be generalized to all types of discourse. In 
order to do so, however, he must explain why some types of discourse seem obviously 
representational even when they are not. He does this by introducing a second sense of 
representation: “i-representation” (“i” for “internalist” or “inferential”):
On the other hand, we have a notion that gives priority to the internal functional role of 
the representation: something counts as a representation in virtue of its position or role 
in some cognitive or inferential architecture. Here it is an internal role of some kind –
perhaps causal-functional, perhaps logic-inferential, perhaps computational – that takes 
the lead. (2013: 36, emphasis in original)
Price then concludes:
Once the distinction between these two notions of representation is on the table, it 
is open to us to regard the two notions as having different applications for different 
theoretical purposes. In particular, it is open to us to take the view that at least by the 
time we get to language there isn’t any useful external notion, of a semantic kind – in 
other words, no useful, general, notion of relations that words and sentences bear to the 
external world, that we might identify with truth and reference. (2013: 37 emphasis in 
original)
Price’s point is this: while plenty of things, such as gas gauges, are e-representational, 
words are not. Instead, words are i-representational. As a result, many discourses – 
such as science – that appear to be e-representational are actually i-representational. 
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So while they are representational, they are not representational in the traditional 
e-representational sense. In what sense then are they representational?
It may help to look irst at moral discourse – no surprise, since this is expressivism’s 
home turf. Take a moral claim: for example, “lying is wrong”. Given its surface 
structure, one might be tempted to read this claim e-representationally, perhaps as 
representing a moral fact about lying. But of course we know better. If we agree 
with Blackburn and Gibbard, then we know that “lying is wrong” doesn’t represent 
anything at all: it is really the expression of an evaluative attitude. However, and 
this is Price’s point, “lying is wrong” does function like a representational claim 
within moral discourse. In particular, like a representational claim, we can use it to 
draw inferences8. Still, the fact that this claim functions like a representational claim 
does not mean that it is one. Or, rather, it means that it is an i-representation, not an 
e-representation.
Turning to scientiic discourse, I think Price has something like the following in 
mind (he is sometimes vague when it comes to details). Consider the claim that “the 
Higgs Boson has a mass of approximately 125GeV”. At irst glance (and probably 
even a second or third) this claim seems to represent the Higgs Boson as having a 
particular mass. But, just as with “lying is wrong”, appearances can be deceiving. 
If Price is right, the function of this claim is not to represent a worldly state of 
affairs. Rather, its function is to allow us to draw further inferences – perhaps further 
inferences about the Higgs Boson, or about other related areas in high energy physics. 
It is because this claim has a certain “position or role in some cognitive or inferential 
architecture” (2013: 36) that we say it is a representation, though as in the case of 
moral discourse it is only an i-representation, not an e-representation. By preserving 
the internal function of scientiic assertions, Price hopes to make the external function 
superluous. When we engage in scientiic discourse we are not representing external 
reality. Instead, among other things, we are expressing the inferential rules that govern 
scientiic discourse. So, according to Price, scientiic discourse is different only in 
degree, not in kind, from moral discourse. The placement issue evaporates.
If Price is correct, then i-representation gives us all the beneits of representa-
tionalism but without the costs that come from trying to solve the placement issue. 
Language is not e-representational, but it performs the same function as if it were. 
Price’s focus on the function of language, while side-stepping the metaphysical 
problems lurking in the shadows, seems rather Pragmatic. 
Representation and Pragmatic Methods
This brings us to the second question: is Price’s Pragmatism consistent? Generally, 
Pragmatists connect meaning with use. Price agrees. But, it seems, the main use of 
8. As noted earlier (see footnote 4) Price could just as easily – and perhaps more accurately – call 
his position a form of global inferentialism. He cites the inferential content of statements every bit 
as much as their expressive content. In “Pragmatism, Expressivism, and Anti-Representationalism” 
(2011: 190-219), Brandom argues against Price’s appropriation of inferentialism, raising objections 
similar to Blackburn’s.
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many discourses is to represent. It would seem to follow, on Pragmatic grounds, that 
representationalism correctly describes how these discourses function. This means it 
isn’t clear that Price can be both a Pragmatist and a global anti-representationalist: that 
he can connect meaning with use yet deny that we use language to represent.
Similarly, as both Blackburn (2013) and Robert Kraut (2007) have pointed out, 
Pragmatists like telling genealogical stories that show how theoretical concepts 
develop from our concrete, practical interactions with the environment. (Dewey is 
probably best known for doing this, though he’s not the only one. Rorty also dabbled 
in this genre.) The problem is that these genealogical stories typically assume that 
representationalism is correct. As Blackburn puts it:
Even genealogical and anthropological stories have to start somewhere. There are 
things that even pragmatists need to rely upon, as they produce what they regard as 
their better understanding of the functions of pieces of discourse...Such genealogical 
stories start with a common-sense background of use, and a world of physical objects, 
with distinct locations, changing only according to distinct regularities with a distinct 
speed limit. (2013: 78)
If Blackburn is correct, then a favorite Pragmatist strategy depends on 
representationalism. Kraut calls this the “no-exit problem”: 
The imagery of stepping outside a discourse and surveying it (without distortion) from 
an external perspective is unclear. It is hard to say “where we stand” in conducting such 
inquiries, or which resources we can import without circularity, or how to measure 
success, or even whether we have succeeded in stepping outside the discourse in 
question. External viewpoints are not always available: certain regions of discourse 
cannot be encapsulated, climbed out of, and surveyed from the outside [...]. Call this the 
No Exit phenomenon. (2007: 9-10)
So this is the challenge for Price’s Pragmatism. First, we can all agree that the 
placement issue poses a real problem for how we understand moral discourse. This 
is because, although moral facts and properties are dificult to defend, it’s hard to see 
how moral discourse can be meaningful without these representationalist concepts. 
Expressivists solve this problem by focusing only on what we do with moral 
discourse. They “side-step” any metaphysical questions that might come up. Because 
expressivists avoid moral facts and properties they have to be especially careful that 
they don’t let them sneak back in. In other words, there has to be a clean exit from 
representationalist concepts and idioms and this seems possible – just possible – in 
the case of moral discourse, and then only if we’re careful. But, Blackburn and Kraut 
argue, scientiic discourse doesn’t have a clean exit. Even if we focus only on what 
we do with scientiic discourse, the stories we tell – likely, genealogical stories about 
how science evolved out of everyday interactions with the physical environment – 
will invoke the same representational concepts and idioms that expressivism was 
supposed to avoid. According to Blackburn and Kraut, scientiic discourse cannot 
escape representationalism. Price responds:
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But why, precisely, should a global pragmatism need an exit, of the kind Blackburn and 
Kraut have in mind? The view that it does so seems at least in part a legacy of the cases 
with which the expressivist began, such as that of ethics. There it was important that the 
distinctive ontology of the ethical viewpoint – values, moral properties and the like – not 
be in view from the pragmatist’s external standpoint. By focusing on moral talk, rather 
than moral properties, the expressivist simply sidesteps the metaphysical conundrums 
that trouble her representationalist opponents, realists and anti-realists alike [...].  
The case of science is different. There isn’t a placement problem for scientiic language, 
at least at irst pass. So there isn’t any pressure to escape to a theoretical standpoint from 
which one doesn’t need to mention such things. (2013: 157-158)
Price’s point is this: Talk of facts and properties isn’t as problematic in scientiic 
discourse as it is in moral discourse. As a result, when talking about science, Pragmatists 
can help themselves to facts and properties without letting representationalism 
sneak back in. Pragmatists can continue telling genealogical stories, stories about 
how scientiic discourse evolved from interactions with everyday objects, without 
becoming committed to representationalism. In other words:
Blackburn seems to be misled by the assumption that the pragmatist needs a standpoint 
outside any vocabulary on which she wants to turn her gaze [...]. [But] there is plenty 
for the pragmatist to say, both in i-representational and e-representational terms, about 
the practical foundations of our ordinary ways of talking and thinking about, and hence 
coping with, the everyday objects themselves. (2013: 159-160)
If Price is right, then Pragmatists can continue drawing connections between meaning 
and use, and theory and practice, without worrying that representationalism will lare 
up again. There will, he assures us, be “plenty for the pragmatist to say”.
Unfortunately, Price doesn’t give examples of what exactly Pragmatists can say. 
All he says, above, is that Pragmatists will be able to speak “both in i-representational 
and e-representational terms”. What can that mean? On a irst pass, Price is simply 
saying that Pragmatists are allowed to talk about the physical world, and its connection 
to scientiic discourse, without assuming any controversial metaphysical theories. 
Thus,
The expressivist’s motto should be that vocabularies should be mentioned but not used 
– theorized about but not employed, at least in the armchair. As long as the expressivist 
keeps this in mind – ensures that her initial theoretical perspective only mentions 
the target vocabulary – there’s no danger that her own casual delationary use of the 
metalinguistic semantic vocabulary will lead her into the metaphysical trap. (2011: 314; 
emphasis in original)
In addition, Price sometimes suggests that Pragmatists will be doing something like 
anthropology:
One of the great virtues of expressivism is the way that it replaces metaphysical questions 
with questions about human thought and language. In place of metaphysical questions 
about the nature of value, or modality, say, it offers us questions about the role and 
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genealogy of evaluative and modal vocabularies – and these are questions about human 
behavior, broadly construed, rather than questions about some seemingly puzzling part 
of the metaphysical realm [...]. Expressivism isn’t a way of doing metaphysics in a 
pragmatist key. It is a way of doing something like anthropology. (2011: 315)
This means that:
The shift I recommend is not a matter of recasting metaphysical issues as issues about 
language but of abandoning the metaphysical questions altogether, in favour of the 
anthropological questions. (2013: 181)
So Price is saying that Pragmatists can give a quasi-anthropological account of 
how certain areas of discourse – areas of discourse that seem paradigmatically 
representational – came about. These accounts show why these areas appear 
representational even though they really aren’t. And the same goes for these 
anthropological accounts themselves. They too might appear representational but 
really are not. Rather, as noted above, “there is plenty for the pragmatist to say, both 
in i-representational and e-representational terms, about the practical foundations of 
our ordinary ways of talking and thinking” (2013: 160). 
But we’re not out of the woods yet. The next question is how these anthropological 
accounts hold up: how do we distinguish a credible, compelling genealogy from a 
dubious, unconvincing one? The obvious answer is that a credible, compelling 
genealogy meets a standard that the dubious, unconvincing one simply doesn’t. But 
what is that standard?
According to Price, there are two kinds of “external constraints” on speciic 
discourses. One, corresponding to e-representation, is “covariance...between a 
tokening of a representation and an element of an external environment” (2013: 37). 
The second, corresponding to i-representation:
Is a kind of “in-game externality” provided by the norms of the game of giving and 
asking for reasons – the fact that, within the game, players bind themselves, in principle, 
to standards beyond themselves. (2013: 37)
A gas gauge e-represents the fuel level. Whether it does a good job depends on an 
external constraint: the actual level of fuel. An area of discourse i-represents a certain 
subject matter. Whether it does a good job depends on “the norms of the game”. 
But this is likely to strike most people as way too squishy. If the only constraints on 
an area of discourse are “in-game” then there’s no principled basis for preferring one 
discourse over another. By its own standards, of course, every game is simply the best. 
The same would be true of discourses. If Pragmatists choose to give anthropological 
accounts of science, or politics, or morality, then that’s all well and good – and it 
would be surprising if these weren’t fantastically successful by whatever the in-game 
standards happen to be. But these accounts won’t convince anyone who isn’t already 
a global expressivist. So, actually, that’s not all well and good.
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Price’s position is very close to Rorty’s. Like Price, Rorty blurred the distinction 
between science and other kinds of discourse. And, like Price, Rorty claimed that 
science (as well as other areas of discourse) was governed only by internal standards 
of correctness. Rorty’s views, of course, were met with howls of protest: some said 
that he was a shabby relativist; others claimed that he wasn’t really a Pragmatist. Even 
though Rorty was often more subtle than his critics acknowledged, his critics did have 
a point. His claims about science, in particular, often seemed a bit too dismissive and 
a bit too unaware of actual scientiic practice9.
The problem for Price is similar. As we’ve seen, Price argues that Pragmatists can 
continue doing genealogy without risk of self-contradiction. Pragmatists, he’s claimed, 
can continue to give anthropological accounts of different areas of discourse, accounts 
supporting a global expressivism, without lapsing into representationalism. But if we 
extend global expressivism to these accounts as well (it is global expressivism, after 
all) then they apparently lose all credibility: since they at most i-represent their target 
discourses, and because they must therefore meet only “in-game” standards, there is 
no external, evidential basis for deciding that some genealogies are more credible than 
others, or even credible at all.
To return to the original question: is Price’s Pragmatism consistent? As we 
saw, Blackburn accuses Price of covertly depending on representationalism. Price 
responds by claiming that Pragmatism can be expressivist all the way down. While 
this would answer the consistency question, it comes at a high cost. By rejecting 
representationalism across the board, Price seems to have undercut his own position, 
depriving it of any kind of evidential support.
A Third Type of Representation
This suggests another way of being a global anti-representationalist – and of being 
a radical Pragmatist. As we saw, Price’s position is more modest than it irst appears. 
On the one hand, his target is primarily “e-representation”: gas gauges e-represent 
the fuel level in your gas tank, but words do not e-represent worldly states of affairs. 
On the other hand, Price is perfectly comfortable with representation in the sense of 
i-representation – though, as I argued above, we shouldn’t be: Price’s i-representation 
undercuts his Pragmatism. So the question is whether you can be a global anti-
representationalist (that is, reject e-representation) without undercutting Pragmatism. 
I think you can and here’s how to do it.
First, recall that for Price i-representation is a way of meeting the traditional 
demands placed on representation while shedding the problems raised by the 
placement issue. Traditionally, representationalism gives an account of the function 
statements serve (they represent the world) as well as an account of the constraints on 
speciic discourses (namely, external constraints). The problem, as Price notes, is that 
many statements either don’t serve a clear representational function or the constraints 
9. In fact, this is one of the points that distinguishes Philip Kitcher’s Pragmatism from Rorty’s – see 
the essays in Kitcher 2012.
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on them are not clearly external. I-representation is how Price then explains the 
function of statements (“perhaps causal-functional, perhaps logic-inferential, perhaps 
computational” (2013: 36)) and the constraints on them (“in-game” constraints). This 
suggests that there are two requirements on any account of representation: irst, that it 
explain the function that statements serve; second, that it account for the constraints 
on areas of discourse.
However there is a third function representation plays in addition to its 
environmental tracking function (e-representation) and its “perhaps logico-inferential” 
(2013: 36) function (i-representation). This is its operational function. I’ll call this 
“o-representation”:
o-Representation: This notion gives priority to the operational functional role of 
representation. Something counts as a representation in virtue of its ability to facilitate 
operations between one’s cognitive architecture and the environment.
The idea here is that representation isn’t merely a matter of mirroring reality 
(e-representation) or of clarifying the inferential connections among statements 
(i-representation). Rather, a fundamental function of representation is to smooth 
interactions with the world. From the standpoint of o-representation, statements 
function primarily as tools that help us come to grips with our world. The constraints 
on these tools are neither straightforwardly external nor straightforwardly internal.
Some examples will help. Let’s begin with a very simple claim: “the pan is 
hot”. This is the sort of thing we might say in a kitchen, perhaps when cooking with 
another person. E-representation does not adequately capture what is being said (or 
represented). The e-representational content of “the pan is hot” is simply that the pan 
is, well, hot. But that content, while true, doesn’t explain why someone would say 
“the pan is hot”, or the signiicance of saying “the pan is hot”, or what is gained by 
saying “the pan is hot”. There are many truths one could also state (“the pan is black”, 
“the pan is iron”, “that is my pan”) so why say, “the pan is hot”? O-representation 
explains why. You say “the pan is hot” when you want to alert your partner: most 
likely you’re either worried she might burn herself or it’s time to add something to the 
pan. You say “the pan is hot” because something needs to be done: someone needs to 
grab a hot pad, or add oil, or perhaps both. Saying “the pan is hot” helps facilitate an 
interaction with the environment. No one gets burned and dinner gets cooked. It’s this 
dimension – the operational and functional dimension expressed by o-representation 
– that e-representation neglects. Likewise i-representation doesn’t fully capture what 
is being represented by “the pan is hot”. From “the pan is hot” one can infer all sort 
of things, including “don’t touch the pan” and “time to add the oil”. However one can 
also infer a multitude of other things such as “the pan is not cold”, “the pan is not at 
room temperature”, “don’t sit on the pan” and “don’t put the cat in the pan”. Only 
some of these inferences are relevant, because only some of these inferences actually 
help you do something. It is because these inferences help you interact with your 
environment, by safely putting dinner on the table, that they give representational 
content to “the pan is hot”. From the standpoint of o-representation, it is therefore 
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the operational content that matters, not the inferential content. This means that 
the representational content of “the pan is hot” (as well as myriad other everyday 
statements) is best understood in terms of o-representation, not e- or i-representation.
To take a second example, consider the social-scientiic concept of race. It’s 
widely recognized that the concept of race has no real biological basis. In addition, 
the concept of race has a pretty ugly history, often being used to justify all sorts of 
despicable policies and acts. At the same time, as Philip Kitcher has noted, the concept 
of race can serve a useful, beneicial function: if we want to igure out why certain 
populations die younger, or suffer from some diseases more than other groups, the 
concept of race can be a useful way of identifying and studying those populations. 
As he puts it:
The notion of race is likely to continue to straddle the divide between well-motivated 
science (for example, the quest to trace patterns of human migration) and social 
applications. Any pragmatic assessment of its value will have to deal in a synthetic and 
balanced way with both types of context. (2012: 156)
Likewise, Elizabeth Anderson has argued that the ideal of color blindness is both 
morally and conceptually confused (2010: 156): color blind policies, while perhaps 
desirable in theory, tend to over-simplify the concept of race and legitimize continued 
discrimination and segregation. If we reject the concept of race entirely then we risk 
fostering more racial discrimination, not less. Or, as Eddie Glaude warns:
Races are as real as football ields, dollar bills, or head-negroes in charge. If they 
are proven to rest on bad science, like phlogiston, it doesn’t make them any less real 
[...]. Race language or black identity cannot be escorted offstage because of some 
questionable conception of the real. (2007: 63-64)
Taken together, this means that a statement such as “African-Americans are nearly 
twice as likely to have diabetes as non-Hispanic whites” does not simply represent a 
worldly state of affairs (as e-representation would have it); nor does it merely help us 
to draw inferences (as i-representation would have it). Of course, these functions are 
not entirely dispensable: certainly part of the function of this statement is that it does 
tell us something about our world and that it does allow us to draw certain inferences. 
(Along these lines, Kitcher proposes that “races are both biologically real and socially 
constructed”, 2012: 149.) But this is neither the whole nor the most important part 
of the story. E- and i-representation may not be entirely dispensable, but they are 
far from being primary or fundamental. Instead, the primary function of statements 
like this is to lead to actions: here, actions that we hope will lead to a decrease in 
diabetes. Knowing that African-Americans have a higher rate of diabetes should lead 
to research, or perhaps a donation to support that research. This is the statement’s 
o-representational content.
Here’s a third example. Geologists deine minerals as naturally occurring, inorganic, 
solid substances, with a deinite chemical formula and a crystalline structure. Most 
people are surprised to learn that ice is a mineral by this deinition (albeit only ice 
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that is naturally occurring, such as glacier ice; ice cubes from the freezer don’t count). 
We’re surprised, no doubt, because ice just doesn’t seem like a mineral: unlike most 
minerals it regularly falls from the sky and can be easily liqueied; we will never see it 
on a list of recommended “vitamins and minerals”; prospectors searching for minerals 
will never be satisied with a handful of snow. So what are we doing when we say that 
ice is a mineral? Again, it does not seem that we are merely representing a worldly 
state of affairs (as e-representation would have it): ice being a mineral is at least as 
much a matter of deinition, and of the history of geology, as it is a matter of ice’s 
natural properties. And it does not seem that we are merely pointing out the inferences 
we can now draw. After all, ice being a mineral is a function of its natural properties, 
including its crystalline structure and deinite chemical formula. So ask yourself this 
question: how did you react the irst time you heard “ice is a mineral”? If you’re like 
me, you were probably skeptical for all the reasons given above. Depending on the 
circumstances, maybe you questioned the person who said it, or maybe you tried 
to verify it on-line, or maybe you just kept reading, waiting to see where this will 
go. The statement “ice is a mineral” need not lead to any direct experience of ice 
(though it could, especially if you’re a geologist). Rather, the important point is that 
this statement leads to some kind of action that reconciles our prior beliefs (ice? a 
mineral!?) with the external environment (ice has the same natural properties as many 
paradigmatic minerals). Those actions relect its o-representational content, which 
will be different for different people in different circumstances.
A fourth example. Consider the case of the Panchen Lama, the second highest 
ranking lama – after the Dalai Lama – in Tibetan Buddhism. After the Dalai Lama’s 
death the Panchen Lama plays a critical role in identifying the Dalai Lama’s next 
incarnation. Today there are two Panchen Lamas. One, Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, 
was recognized by the Dalai Lama when he was six years old – and was promptly 
detained by the Chinese authorities. He hasn’t been seen in public since 1995 and his 
whereabouts are unknown. The other, Gyancain Norbu, is recognized by China, holds 
a leading position in the Buddhist Association of China, and will most likely igure 
prominently in choosing the next Dalai Lama. Most observers would say that Gedhun 
Choekyi Nyima, the Dalai Lama’s choice, is the real Panchen Lama. But there’s also 
something odd about making this claim. After all, according to Tibetan Buddhism, the 
current Panchen Lama (whoever that is) is actually the eleventh in a lineage stretching 
back to the 14th  century, each one a reincarnation of the previous Panchen Lama. 
If the question is whether Gedhun Choekyi Nyima or Gyancain Norbu is the real 
reincarnation of the tenth Panchen Lama, then most of us reading this article would 
probably say that neither is, because there is no such thing as reincarnation. However, 
at the same time, most of us probably ind China’s actions deplorable: Gedhun Choekyi 
Nyima is the real Panchen Lama, we say, and China’s actions shouldn’t affect how 
the next Dalai Lama is chosen. So what are we doing when we state that Gedhun 
Choekyi Nyima is the real Panchen Lama? Well, once again, it does not seem as if 
we are representing an external, worldly, state of affairs. After all, most of us would 
deny that anything like reincarnation exists or that Gedhun Choekyi Nyima is really 
the reincarnation of the tenth Panchen Lama. Nor does it seem as if we’re merely 
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endorsing the inferences this statement allows. Here it isn’t the inferences that matter 
so much as the fact that China is using illegitimate means to control the process of 
choosing the next Dalai Lama. Instead, the statement that Gedhun Choekyi Nyima is 
the real Panchen Lama leads to actions: perhaps to lobbying China for his whereabouts 
and condition, perhaps to rejecting Gyancain Norbu’s legitimacy as Panchen Lama, 
perhaps to working out contingency plans for recognizing the next Dalai Lama. Once 
again, this is what the statement “Gedhun Choekyi Nyima is the real Panchen Lama” 
o-represents.
To sum up, o-representation underscores the operational importance of statements: 
how statements are used to stimulate and guide interactions with the world. As these 
four examples illustrate, statements can be o-representational even when they are not 
clearly e- or i-representational. I’ll have more to say about this below.
An account of representation should also explain the constraints on particular 
areas of discourse. As the examples above illustrate, the constraints are both external 
and internal. Whether it’s appropriate to say “the pan is hot” depends on both external 
factors (the temperature of the pan) as well as internal features of the discourse of 
cooking (a 65ºc pan may be hot to the touch, but it’s not what a cook means by 
“hot”). Race, as Kitcher notes, is both “biologically real and socially constructed”, ice 
being a mineral is both a function of its natural properties and a particular disciplinary 
deinition, and the identity of the Panchen Lama depends both on the actions of the 
Chinese authorities as well as the traditions of Tibetan Buddhism. The constraints on 
these particular statements hold as well for the discourses in which they occur.
There are two typical objections to what I’ve said so far. The irst is this: even if 
the examples above are legitimate cases of o-representation, there are many others 
that are not. For example, some might claim that “the cat is on the mat”, “snow is 
white”, and “grass is green” – not to mention other claims favored by philosophers 
– are best understood e-representationally, as straightforward representations of the 
external world. There’s some truth to this: after all, it’s hard to imagine what actions 
“grass is green” would inspire. But that’s exactly the problem, and it’s a problem for 
e-representation, not o-representation. Statements like “grass is green” are neither 
interesting nor surprising; in fact, it is hard to imagine a normal real-life situation 
(at least a situation outside a philosophy paper) where someone would actually say 
“grass is green”. Perhaps when bemoaning a brown lawn? Or after a long, snow-
covered winter? The question then is whether these sorts of statements should drive 
our theory. Should we treat statements of this sort as the rule, or as the exception? 
My recommendation is that we treat these as the exception. Although true, they 
are boring, pointless assertions that we’re unlikely to come across except when 
doing philosophy. I suspect a large number of philosophical examples fall into this 
category.
Another way of putting it is this: if the main function of language is simply to 
allow us to say things like “grass is green” – if “grass is green” is the paradigm – 
then it’s hard to see what value language would have or why it would ever evolve. 
If, on the other hand, language evolved to help us cope with our environment 
(a plausible assumption to make), then it is practically a truism that o-representation 
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would be more fundamental than e-representation. This would mean that statements 
with o-representational content – statements about hot pans, race and diabetes, the 
classiication of ice, and the identity of the Panchen Lama, for example – should be 
viewed as the rule, while statements about trivial properties of snow and grass are the 
exceptions. Our theories will be better off to the extent that we focus on the former, 
not the latter.
The second objection is that this account makes things a lot less tidy. Both 
e-representation and i-representation presuppose simple, clear-cut constraints on 
different areas of discourse. In the case of e-representation the constraints are external; 
in the case of i-representation the constraints are internal (what Price refers to as “in-
game externality” which isn’t really external at all). In the case of o-representation 
the constraints can be both. One might think that o-representation would then take 
on the weaknesses of both external and internal constraints. To the contrary, I think 
the account is actually stronger for incorporating both types of constraints. As we’ve 
seen, the problem with exclusively external constraints is that they seem completely 
absent in many areas of discourse. The problem with exclusively internal constraints 
is that they prevent us from taking an external standpoint on the credibility of speciic 
discourses. The common-sense (dare I say Pragmatic?) solution is to combine the 
two. The constraints on any given area of discourse are a combination of external 
and internal factors that are necessary to effectively interact with one’s environment. 
The result may be less tidy, but it has the advantage of being a lot more realistic.
O-representation therefore has some signiicant advantages over both e- and 
i-representation. Because it deines representation in terms of operations and 
interactions, it avoids the metaphysical problems facing traditional representationalism. 
Unlike e-representation, it does not face the placement issue. It thus offers a fully 
generalizable, global account of representation. And, unlike i-representation, 
o-representation doesn’t depend on only “in-game” constraints. By recognizing both 
internal and external constraints, o-representation recognizes that speciic areas of 
discourse depend on external factors for their credibility.
Indeed, it’s possible to view e- and i-representation as special cases (very special 
cases) of o-representation. If the core function of representation is to facilitate 
operations and interactions with the external world, then e-representation captures 
those cases where the interaction is purely a matter of mirroring. I’d argue that we’re 
not likely to come across many such cases in the wild, though we frequently ind them 
in the artiicial surroundings of philosophy. As noted above, a statement such as “grass 
is green” may come close to being purely e-representational – but it is nearly useless 
to say in real life. As far as what we use language for, these kinds of statements should 
be viewed as the exception, not the rule. Likewise, i-representation covers those cases 
where a discourse has little contact with the external world. Some areas of mathematics 
may be purely i-representational (though we still expect mathematics to pay practical 
dividends in terms of our interactions with the world). Other discourses may be 
i-representational if they don’t facilitate any practical operations or interactions – but 
when a discourse only follows its own internal logic that is usually a sign of sickness, 
not of health. Once again, we should treat these as exceptions, not rules.
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A Historical Interlude
This leaves many of the details of o-representation to be worked out, but there are 
some historical precedents to help point in the right direction. Price frequently alludes 
to Wittgenstein, Sellars and Dewey in support of his global anti-representationalism. 
Turning our attention to Dewey, it is surprising how little he had to say about 
representationalism explicitly. Price quotes from a 1905 letter where Dewey writes 
about giving the “coup de grâce to representationalism” (2011: 204) but just about the 
only place where Dewey explicitly addresses representationalism – by name – is in a 
pair of articles published in The Journal of Philosophy in 1922. There Dewey defends 
what he calls a “naturalistic realism” where things – ranging from natural objects, 
to artifacts, to words – function as representations when they “mean or support a 
certain conclusion” (1922: 352). The connection between the representation and what 
is represented is a pragmatic connection:
The “pragmatic” feature comes in when it is noted that experiment or action enters to 
make the connection between the thing signifying and the thing signiied so that inference 
may pass from hypothesis to knowledge. It is then seen that some “consequences”, 
namely those of the experiment, are an integral part of the completing or fulilling or 
leading out of the “representation” into inal objects. (1922: 354)
Dewey’s point seems generally consistent with what I’ve argued here: representation 
is largely a matter of facilitating interactions (or, as Dewey says, “experiment or 
action”) with the world.
Dewey would also speak of truth in operational terms. In his debate with Russell 
over the correspondence theory of truth he wrote:
My own view takes correspondence in the operational sense:...the meaning, namely of 
answering, as a key answers to conditions imposed by a lock, or as two correspondents 
“answer” each other; or, in general, as a reply is an adequate answer to a question or a 
criticism – as, in short, a solution answers the requirements of a problem. On this view, 
both partners in “correspondence” are open and above board, instead of one of them 
being forever out of experience and the other in it by way of a “percept” or whatever. 
(1941: 178, emphasis in original)
Dewey’s irst point is that correspondence (we can just as well read “representation”) 
is not a matter of our minds or language mirroring the external world. Rather, the 
relationship is much more active (“operational”) than the mirroring metaphor implies. 
His second point is that correspondence cannot be reduced to a purely internal 
relation: whether a statement is true depends on more than how well it coheres with 
other claims. There are objective constraints on whether a statement corresponds to 
(or represents) “worldly states of affairs” just as not every proposed solution will 
successfully solve its designated problem.
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Conclusion: Radical Pragmatism Redux
The question is whether one can be a radical Pragmatist and reject representa-
tionalism across the board. My answer is a qualiied yes: following Price, I agree 
that representationalism (speciically, e-representationalism) appears unable to solve 
the placement issue. So: yes to global anti-representationalism. I also agree with 
Price that there are other senses of representationalism to replace e-representation, 
but I disagree with him that i-representationalism is the right replacement. I would 
argue that o-representationalism is the way to go. So: a qualiied yes to global anti-
representationalism.
To recap: irst, o-representation enjoys the beneits of e-representation but 
without the metaphysical baggage. Most importantly, it helps explain how scientiic 
statements help us interact with our environment: while e-representation emphasizes 
mirroring and tracking, o-representation emphasizes operations and interactions. 
Second, o-representation is also better than i-representation at accounting for scientiic 
discourse. It does not reduce science to a game following purely internal rules; rather, 
by highlighting the operational function of our statements it helps explain why science 
is the generally successful enterprise it is. Here again the crucial difference is that 
while i-representation emphasizes internal relations and inferential connections, 
o-representation emphasizes the operations that bring us into relation with worldly 
states of affairs.
O-representation allows us to be resolutely anti-representational in all the ways that 
matter. While representationalism raises a host of metaphysical problems (including 
the placement issue Price identiies), these problems do not arise for o-representation. 
To the extent that moral and modal forms of discourse facilitate interactions with the 
surrounding environment, we may safely view these discourses as o-representational; 
there is thus no need to ind grounds for distinguishing between scientiic, moral, and 
modal discourses, among others.
The radical Pragmatism Price proposes, and which I’ve proposed modifying, is 
clearly indebted to Rorty’s linguistic neo-pragmatism. Here, pragmatism is treated 
as a linguistic thesis opposed to traditional forms of representationalism. But there 
are some important differences. By emphasizing operations and o-representations, 
this approach makes space for pragmatic approaches to other concepts besides 
representation: pragmatic concepts of truth, justiication, and experience now have a 
clear point of entry. As I’ve suggested above, there are likely some points of contact 
between a radical Pragmatism and Dewey’s philosophy. 
Richard Rorty often argued that Dewey was “waiting at the end of the dialectical 
road which analytic philosophy traveled” (1982: xviii). This prompted Ralph Sleeper 
to write that, actually, “Dewey was trying to block that road from its beginning” 
(1987: 5). Whichever is right – and I think they both are – radical Pragmatism shows 
us the road ahead.
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